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On the first page of How to do Things with Words, 
Austin claims that `making a statement’ is primary, and 
`statement’ derivative – a `logical construction’, as he calls 
it, out of the makings of statements.  Wittgenstein, in 
similar vein, takes `explaining the meaning’ to be primary 
with `meaning’ a derivative notion.  He says that 
`[m]eaning is what an explanation of meaning explains 
(Wittgenstein 1974, 68).  Part of Wittgenstein’s point is that 
giving explanations of meaning is, like the making of 
statements, a perfectly common, everyday occurrence, but 
asking what meaning is is a perverse question of the sort 
that gives philosophy a bad name – Austin makes the 
same point in his paper `The Meaning of a Word’ (Austin 
1961, 23-43).   Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of why 
philosophers are misled is very simple:  the mistake lies in 
supposing that, for every noun there is an object named 
(unum nomen, unum nominatum) and so coming to believe 
that there is something – some thing – named by the noun 
`meaning’.  He says that he wants to cure us of the 
temptation to look about us for some object which you 
might call `the meaning’ (Wittgenstein 1958, 1).  This is 
hardly a new insight.  Kant famously argued, in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, that the noun `time’ does not 
name a thing and one consequence of this conclusion is 
that talk of the Big Bang as marking the beginning of time 
is nonsensical.  Are there some comparably important 
conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis that the 
nouns `meaning’ and `statement’ do not name objects?  
The answer, as I hope to demonstrate, is `Yes’. 
Let us first get clear on the thesis.  Wittgenstein 
says that (for a large class of cases in which we employ 
the word `meaning’) the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language (Wittgenstein 1953, §43).  But the use of the 
referring expression `the use’ might, again, create the 
misleading impression that we are talking about some 
object.  A useful comparison is between a screwdriver and 
the use of a screwdriver – we don’t think of the latter as 
having such object-like qualities as a location, and 
likewise, meaning is not a locateable entity.  So, straight 
away, we have Important Conclusion No. 1: Meanings ain’t 
in the head – for they are not located anyplace, and in fact 
they ain’t no `they’.  Now Putnam, when he argued from 
Twin-Earthian considerations that meanings are not in the 
head, went on to suppose that, in part at least, they were 
outside the head -- hence Externalism.  But, if Wittgenstein 
is right about the ontology of meaning, then meanings 
can’t be outside the head either.  In particular, 
understanding an utterance – grasping the meaning – is 
not to be construed as oneself or one’s mind standing in 
relation to something, to a Russellian proposition, for 
example. 
Important Conclusion No.2 now comes into view.  
Let us suppose that Portia has never come across the 
name `Tully’, but knows that Cicero is a Roman orator.  
Since `Tully is a Roman orator’ and `Cicero is a Roman 
orator’ express the same Russellian proposition then if 
Portia thinks or understands that Cicero is a Roman orator, 
it seems that she must equally think or understand that 
Tully is a Roman orator.  Yet, intuitively, it seems false to 
say that Portia thinks that Tully is a Roman orator.  Once 
we free ourselves from bondage to the prejudice that to 
think or to understand is to stand in a relation to some 
object such as a Russellian proposition or a Fregean 
thought (again an object, but one existing in Plato’s 
heaven) a simple explanation of our (correct) intuitions 
becomes available.  When telling you about Portia, I 
assumed that you, as an educated scholar, knew that 
`Tully’ is another name for `Cicero’, or would have inferred 
it from what I said.  But suppose that I were conversing 
with a person, Hans, who, unlike Portia, did not know the 
name `Cicero’, but knew a lot about the Roman orator 
whom he (Hans) knew as `Tully’.   It would be pointless my 
reporting Portia’s belief to Hans by using the words `Portia 
believes that Cicero is a Roman orator’.  I would, instead, 
say to Hans `Portia believes that Tully is a Roman orator’ 
and, under these circumstances, what I say is true.  Have I 
just concluded, then, that the proposition `Portia believes 
that Tully is a Roman orator’ is both false and true?  Not at 
all.  The moral to be drawn here is that it is not Russellian 
propositions that have truth-value; the bearer of truth or 
falsity is what is stated by the speaker, and what is stated 
by the speaker is a function of context – in particular, of 
what the speaker takes to be relevant beliefs of the hearer.  
It is always such considerations of the particularities of 
context that allow us to escape from substitutivity puzzles. 
If, as we argued earlier, it is not a sentence but 
what is stated by a speaker that has truth-value, what are 
we to make of Tarski’s Convention T 
S is true iff p 
where `S’ is a name or description of the sentence 
appearing on the right hand side of the biconditional?  
Tarski, as a result of examining a case where the sentence 
substituting for `p’ was a Liar-type sentence concluded that 
ordinary language is incoherent.  But if we `fix up’ 
Convention T, allowing as substituends for `S’ only 
expressions designating what is said by a speaker (i.e., the 
statement made) then a different possibility suggests itself; 
in fact, Important Conclusion No. 3:  Liar-type sentences 
fail to make statements.  This conclusion comes about as 
follows:  Our reformulated Convention T is a most basic, 
incontrovertible truth about truth.  If someone say that pigs 
can fly then what he says is true if and only if pigs can fly.  
So we wish to insist that Convention T is true: if someone 
makes a statement – says something that is either true or 
false – then Convention T applies to it.  Now suppose that 
`L’ designates a statement made by the sentence `L is not 
true’.  Making the appropriate substitutions in our 
reformulated Convention T gives 
L is true iff L is not true 
and that is certainly not true.  But, as we 
mentioned, reformulated Convention T is true in every 
instance, and we have no need to deny that, so long as we 
reject the assumption just made, that `L’ designates a 
statement made by the sentence `L is not true’.  In other 
words, there can be no statement that says of itself that it 
is not true.  But, since the Liar Paradox (in this case, the 
Strengthened Liar) starts from the assumption that there is 
such a statement and derives a contradiction from it, a 
principled rejection of the assumption is a dissolution of the 
paradox. 
This is very good progress: three important 
conclusions from one ontological insight, and we could 
stop here, well pleased.  But considerations of space do 




not allow me not to go into further details, so I shall add 
some more words on the third conclusion.  The first thing 
to be said is that, although it has been reached by a novel 
route, that conclusion is not new.  In mediaeval insolubilia 
literature up to about 1225, the idea that the Liar sentence 
fails to make a statement was quite common.  Impatient 
critics in those days complained that the sentence contains 
good words in good grammatical order, with no category 
mistakes or any other infelicity, so how could it not be a 
statement?  What the Austin/Wittgenstein ontological 
insight shows is that making a statement is different, in 
important respects, from producing a pheme or a 
grapheme. 
Second, there is an alternative, utterly simple proof 
of the same result obtainable entirely within classical logic.  
Classically, we accept the Principle of Bivalence, which 
says that every statement is either true (1) or false (0) -- 
not neither, not both, not anything inbetween,  i.e. 
For all statements p,  val(p) = 1 or (exclusively) val(p) = 0 
Accept also classical negation: 
For all statements p,  val (not-p) = 1 - val (p) 
 Now consider sentence A, which is `B is not true' 
Obviously val (A) = 1- val (B) 
But now l`et' A = B (giving us the Strengthened Liar) 
We have, then, val (A) = 1 - val(A) 
i.e. val (A) = ½ 
Therefore (from Bivalence) A is not a statement. 
Likewise if, when doing elementary algebra, we 
discover that the value of x is 1 – the value of y, we cannot 
then `let’ x be equal to y; no finite number can be 1 less 
than itself.. 
If A is not a statement, it doesn't say anything – it 
doesn't say anything true, false or anything inbetween; it 
doesn’t say that it is either false or neither true nor false.  
That disposes of the simple and strengthened Liar. 
The difference between sentences and statements 
is evident most obviously in sentences that contain 
indexicals.  The type sentence `It’s hot here’ is clearly 
neither true nor false, but neither is a token of that 
sentence, if a token is taken to be a physical sign 
(grapheme).  For I may take on an expedition to the North 
Pole a token of that sentence written on a slip of paper that 
I found at my starting point in Accra.   This token, though it 
may have a meaning (in Kaplan’s terms, a `character’ in 
that it can be translated into a foreign language) does not 
have a content or a truth-value.  It is the use of a token on 
a given occasion (i.e. a statement) that has a content.  If, 
on reaching Greenland, I pull the token out of my pocket 
and show it to a deaf native in order to start up a 
conversation (as opposed, say, to making him a gift of the 
piece of paper) then it is my location that gives content to 
the utterance, and the temperature there that determines 
its truth-value. 
One striking fact about paradoxes in the Liar family 
is the prevalence of indexical expressions.  Thus (in a 16th 
Century variant) we have a card on one side of which is 
written `The statement on the other side is false’ while 
what is written on the other side is `The statement on the 
other side is true’.  The presence of the word `statement’ 
should not fool us into thinking that there are any 
statements here (any more than we should be fooled into 
thinking that the phrase `this number which is 1 less than 
itself’ denotes a number).  In virtue of the character of the 
sentence on the first side of the card, we look on the other 
side of the card in order to determine the content and truth-
value of what is written on the first side.   And if what is 
written on the second side were `Pigs can fly’, then the 
content would be established and we could rest content.  
But, in the paradoxical case, the sentence on one side 
needs to inherit content from the sentence on the other, 
but the latter needs to inherit content from the former.  
Result: no content and no truth-value for either.  It’s like 
trying to make a telephone call to someone when that 
person is trying to make a telephone call to you: neither 
person succeeds. 
Tarski’s classic presentation of the Liar in his 
paper on the concept of truth in formalized languages 
employs an indexical – he uses the symbol `c’ as a 
typographical abbreviation of the expression `the sentence 
printed on this page, line 5 from the top’, and on line 5 of 
the page stand the words 
c is not a true sentence 
and nothing else.  It is easy enough to modify the 
example so as to eliminate the indexical expression – 
instead of `this page’, we could have `page 158 of J.H. 
Woodger (trans.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics’.  In 
so doing, we replace the expression containing the 
indexical with one that gives the geographical co-ordinates 
of a particular sentence. And, so long as we assume that 
where there is a sentence there must be a statement, we 
shall run into paradox. But, as we have demonstrated in 
the `card’ version above, that assumption is vulnerable. 
Let us, finally, consider a version of the Liar, 
discussed by R.L. Goodstein (1958) in which truth and 
falsity are ascribed to what is said by a person A.  The 
following proof closely follows Goodstein/Slater (2001).  In 
this version, A says that everything that he says is false, 
which we can formalise as 
Sa§((x)(Sax ⊃ ~Tx)) 
Write y as an abbreviation of §((x)(Sax ⊃ ~Tx)) 
(x)(Sax ⊃ Tx)  Assumption 
Say ⊃ Ty 2, UI 
Say  (Rewriting of 1.) 
Ty 3,4, MP 
(x)(Sax ⊃ ~Tx)  -- since T§p → p 
(∃x)Sax  -- well, for a start, he said y 
~Tb 6,7 
Tb  2,7 
~(x)(Sax ⊃ Tx) 8,9,2,  RA (discharging 
Assumption 2) 
(∃x)(Sax & ~Tx) 
This is the first part of the proof – A says 
something untrue. 
12.  (x)(Sax ⊃ ~Tx) Assumption 
13  Ty (since p → T§p) 
14. Say ⊃ ~Ty  12, UI 
15. ~Ty 4,14, MP 
16. ~ (x)(Sax ⊃ ~Tx) 12,13,15, RA (discharging 
assumption 12) 
17. (∃x)(Sax & Tx)  -- A says something true. 




Goodstein takes himself to have dissolved the 
version of the Liar with which he deals.  He says that 
`instead of a paradox [we find] a proof of the sentence: If A 
says that everything which he says is false then A says 
something false and something true’. 
Yet this result is in itself paradoxical.  For we are 
given that A made a statement, and we seem to have 
deduced, by pure logic alone, that A must have said at 
least one other thing.  But why could A not just have said 
the one sentence we attributed to him and no other?  
Goodstein seems to have proved that, whatever the truth-
value of A’s statement that we are scrutinizing, he must 
have made other statements at least one of which has a 
truth-value opposite to that one.  Can logic deliver us such 
a strong empirical result? 
In the case where A just does utter the one 
sentence `Everything I say is not true’ – so that he is 
effectively uttering the Strengthened Liar `What I am 
saying is untrue’ -- then, if Goodstein is right that A says 
both something true and something false, his sentence 
must be both true and false, as Dialetheists claim, or it 
must be ambiguous, as B.H. Slater claims; that is, it must 
be one sentence expressing two statements, but those 
statements are ineffable.  Unfortunately, Slater does not 
provide much support for this claim, save to offer for 
comparison the sentence `There is a thought for which 
there is no linguistic expression in English’.  Obviously, if 
there is such a thought, then there can be no statement in 
English expressing it. 
Recognizing ineffability in this special case goes 
no way towards making it plausible that at least one of the 
statements made by the Liar sentence is ineffable.  And 
there seems a much simpler way to confront Goodstein:  It 
will be noted that at steps 6 and 13 of the above proof, 
Tarski’s classical Convention T was invoked.  But to say 
that a non-statement (i.e. something without a truth-value) 
is true is to say something straightforwardly false.  Truth-
valueless items are not available for plugging into the 
Tarski biconditional, for doing so would make one side of 
the biconditional false, the other truth-valueless, hence the 
biconditional itself would be false.  Once again, the answer 
seems to be that those 13th Century logicians were right – 
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